We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The goal of the network designer is to assist the nodes reach consensus by changing the weights of a limited number of links in the network. Meanwhile, an adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent the nodes from converging. We formulate two problems to describe this competition where the order in which the players act is reversed in the two problems. We utilize Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (MP) to tackle both problems and derive the optimal strategies. Although the canonical equations provided by the MP are intractable, we provide an alternative characterization for the optimal strategies that makes connection to potential theory. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium for the underlying zero-sum game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various physical and biological phenomena where global patterns of behavior stem from local interactions have been modelled using linear averaging dynamics. In such dynamics an agent updates its value as a linear combination of the values of its neighbors. Averaging dynamics is the basic building block in many multi-agent systems, and it is widely used whenever an application requires multiple agents, who are graphically constrained, to synchronize their measurements. Examples include formation control, coverage, distributed optimization, and flocking [1] - [3] . Linear averaging finds applications in social science research as well [4] .
In practice, communication among agents is prone to different types of non-idealities which can affect the convergence properties of the associated distributed algorithms. Transmission delays [5] , noisy links [6] , [7] , and quantization [8] are some examples of non-idealities that are due to the physical nature of the application. In addition to physical restrictions, researchers have also studied averaging dynamics in the presence of malicious nodes in the network [9] , [10] . Various algorithms that guarantee resilience against node failures have been proposed in the literature [11] .
In [12] , we explored the effect of an external adversary who attempts to prevent the nodes from reaching consensus by disconnecting certain links in the network. We derived the optimal strategy of the adversary and demonstrated that it admits a potential-theoretic analogy. In this paper, we introduce a network designer who attempts to counter the Research supported in part by an AFOSR MURI Grant FA9550-10-1-0573.
Ali Khanafer and Tamer Başar are with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, ECE Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA khanafe2,basar1@illinois.edu Behrouz Touri is with the ECE Department, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA touri@gatech.edu effect of the adversary and help the nodes reach consensus by changing the weights of certain links. Both the adversary and the designer are constrained by their physical capabilities, e.g., battery life and communication range. To capture such constraints, we allow the adversary and the designer to affect only a fixed number of links.
Such an interaction between a network designer and an adversary can occur in various practical applications. For example, in a wireless network, the adversary can be a jammer who is capable of breaking links by injecting high noise signals that disrupt the communication among nodes. The link weights in such a network represent the capacities of the corresponding links. The designer can modify the capacity of a certain link using various communication techniques such as introducing parallel channels between two nodes as in orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) networks [13] .
Our model in this paper is different from the models in the current literature in two ways: (i) the adversary and the designer compete over a dynamical network. This is different from the problems studied in the computer science and economics communities where the network is usually static [14] ; (ii) the players in our model are constrained and do not have infinite budgets. This enables us to model practical scenarios more closely rather than allowing the malicious behaviour to be unrestricted as in [9] , [15] , [16] .
The main goal of this work is to derive optimal strategies for the designer and the adversary who have conflicting objectives. Because the order in which the players act affects the resulting utilities, we formulate two problems based on the order of play, allowing each player to have the first-moveadvantage in one of the problems. When the adversary is allowed to play first, he is capable of restricting the available actions of the designer since some links will disappear from the network. Hence, if we were to cast a zero-sum game between the players, we should not expect the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies. The question we would like to answer is then: are there scenarios where the order of play does not affect the eventually attained utilities of the players, which leads to the existence of an SPE?
Accordingly, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We capture the interaction between the designer and the adversary by formulating two problems. In the minmax problem, the designer declares a strategy first to which the adversary reacts by its optimal response. The second problem is a max-min one where the order of play is reversed. We derive the optimal strategies in both problems by employing the Maximum Principle (MP).
• We provide a method to compute the optimal strategies without requiring the adjoint equations to be solved, which leads to a new characterization for the optimal strategies in terms of potential-theoretic quantities. • We derive a sufficient condition for the existence of an SPE. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate and provide the preliminaries of the minmax and max-min problems. We analyze both problems in Section III and derive their solutions. An implementation method is provided in Section IV. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an SPE in Section V, and we conclude the paper in Section VI. Notation: We denote the set of edges in a graph G by E(G). When clear from the context, we will drop the argument of any set defined on a graph. To emphasize the effect of link removal by the adversary, we will sometimes write G(u(t)) to denote the graph resulting after the adversary acts at time t ∈ [0, ∞). We will use j>i (.) to mean n j=2
[.] T to denote the transpose of a vector or a matrix [.] , and 1 to denote the n-dimensional column vector of 1's. The (i, j)-th element of a matrix X is denoted by X ij . We will use "strategy" and "action" interchangeably; since we are seeking optimal open-loop strategies in this paper, both terms are equivalent.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a connected network of n nodes and m links described by a weighted undirected graph G = (N , E(G)) with vertex set N , |N | = n, and edge set E, |E| = m. We will denote an edge in E(G) between nodes i and j by {i, j}. The weight of edge {i, j} is a ij . The value, or state, of the nodes at time instant t ∈ [0, ∞) is given by x(t) = [x 1 (t), ..., x n (t)] T . The nodes start with an initial value x(0) = x 0 and want to compute the average of their initial measurements, x avg = 1 n n i=1 x i (0), via local averaging. We consider the continuous-time averaging dynamics:
where the matrix A, A ij = a ij , has the following properties:
Definex = 1x avg and let M = 11 T n . A well-known result states that, under the above assumptions, the nodes will reach consensus as t → ∞, i.e., lim t→∞ x(t) =x [1] . To achieve their respective objectives, the designer and the adversary control the elements of A as we describe next. This will render the matrix A to be time-varying.
The adversary attempts to slow down convergence by breaking at most ≤ m links at each time t. Let u ij (t) ∈ {0, 1} be the weight the adversary assigns to link {i, j}. He breaks link {i, j} at time t when u ij (t) = 1. His control is given by u(t) = [u 12 (t), ..., u 1n (t), u 23 (t), ..., u (n−1)n (t)] T ∈ R ( n 2 ) . We will denote the number of links the adversary breaks at time t by
Meanwhile, the network designer attempts to accelerate convergence by controlling the weights of the edges. Let
be the control of the designer. The designer can change the weight of a given link by adding v ij (t) to its weight a ij . We assume that v ij (t) ∈ {0, b} and that the number of links the designer modifies is at most . We denote the number of links the designer modifies by N v (t) := j>i 1 {vij =b} . Given the above definitions, we can write down the {i, j}-th element of the matrix A(u(t), v(t)) as
Given a time interval [0, T ], introduce:
where the kernel k(t) is positive and integrable over [0, T ]. This constitutes the utility function of the adversary, and that of the designer is −J(u, v). We will study two problems. In the first one, the adversary acts first by selecting the links he is interested in breaking. Then, the network designer optimizes his choices over the resulting graph G(u(t)). Accordingly, the action sets of the players for each t are
The sup-inf problem can now be formally written as
In the second problem, the order is reversed. Because the designer acts first in this problem, he can optimize over the entire graph G. Thus, the action set of the designer in this problem is V := V(0); the action set of the adversary remains the same. We can then write
In a computer network, where consensus could model the spread of a virus, the sup-inf problem allows the network designer (who is the maximizer here) to architect networks that are robust against strategic virus diffusion. The infsup problem finds applications in army combat situations where the designer (the minimizer) attempts to counter the attacks of the enemy intending to disrupt the communication among agents. For both problems, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The initial matrix A(0, 0), the time interval [0, T ], the values and b, and the initial state x 0 are common information to both players. We recall the definition of an SPE. 
The following remarks are now in order. Remark 1: (Non-Rectangular Strategy Sets and Existence of SPE) When the strategy sets are rectangular, i.e., the strategy of one player does not restrict the strategy space of the other, the following relationship holds:
where V , V are called the lower and upper values of the game, respectively. When the strategy sets are nonrectangular, however, the order in (4) may not hold. Moreover, one should not expect inequality (3) to hold, and hence an SPE may not exist. In the sup-inf problem in this paper, the strategy sets of the players are non-rectangular as the adversary's action, removing links from G, could restrict the actions available to the designer. Hence, the sup-inf and inf-sup problems should be studied separately. Remark 2: (Problem Complexity) Let us consider the problem of the adversary for a given strategy of the designer. Assume that the adversary can act at K time instances over the interval [0, T ]. Then, for small , recalling that N u = , the total number of links that need to be tested in a bruteforce approach is m K ≈ m K . Clearly, the brute-force approach incurs exponential-time complexity, especially if m or k becomes large. The same argument applies to the network designer.
III. ADVERSARY VS. NETWORK DESIGNER: TWO PROBLEMS We will now present the solutions to the two problems introduced above. To arrive at the optimal strategies of the players, we employ the MP. In what follows, we will often drop the time index and other arguments for notational simplicity.
A. Existence of Optimal Controls and Infinite Switching
As described above, the designer and the adversary are both capable of changing the system matrix. This renders the system a switched one. The optimal controllers for such systems can switch infinitely many times over a finite interval, a phenomenon called "Zeno behavior". To avoid infinite switching, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2: Switching in the value of u i or v i , i = 1, . . . , r, incurs a small cost η > 0. We need to study whether optimal controllers seize to exist after imposing a cost on switching. Further, the MP provides a necessary condition for optimality, and before one can apply it, it is important to show that an optimal solution indeed exists. The following theorem states that optimal solutions exist for both sup-inf and inf-sup problems; for a proof, see [18] .
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 2, the inf-sup and supinf problems both admit optimal solutions. Moreover, the optimal controllers switch finitely many times over a finite interval. The following corollary is immediate. 
It is important to note that our goal is not to optimize the cost on using control; we imposed a small cost on switching to avoid Zeno behavior in order for the strategies we will derive to be implementable. Also, note that τ depends on η; hence, one can choose η small enough so as to arrive at the desired dwell time.
Having shown that optimal solutions exists, we can now replace "inf" by "min" and "sup" by "max" in what follows.
B. The Min-Max Problem
The Hamiltonian associated with the max-min problem is:
The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are (noting that A T = A) [19] :
To find the optimal strategies, let us first write
Define the function
Note that we cannot decouple the maximization (or minimization) into n 2 maximization problems, each corresponding to a link or a single term inside the double summation. This is due to the constraint on the number of links that can be targeted by the players. Before finding the optimal strategies, let us first define the following sets. Let F(G ) = {f ij < 0 : {i, j} ∈ E(G )} for some graph G . It should be noted that although {i, j} and {j, i} belong to E(G ), we include f ij only once in F(G ), i.e., we treat {i, j} and {j, i} as one link. This applies to all the definitions to follow. Let F π (G ) be a ranking of the set F(G ) such that F π,1 (G ) ≤ . . . ≤ F π,|F (G )| (G ). Further, let F π (G ) be the set containing the smallest values in F π (G ). It is understood that if F π (G ) contains fewer than negative elements, F π will contain all those elements. Define the set operator Φ : S(G ) → E(G ) that returns the links in E(G ) that correspond to the elements of S(G ). Also, define Φ i : S(G ) → E(G ) that returns the links in E(G ) corresponding to the smallest i elements of the set S(G ). When |S(G )| < i, Φ i (S(G )) = Φ(S(G )). We also adopt the convention Φ 0 (.) = {∅}. We can then write
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of the adversary and the designer; for a proof, see [18] . Theorem 2: The optimal strategies for the network designer and the adversary in the max-min problem are
C. The Min-Max Problem
We now study the min-max problem. Similar to the above, we can write (recalling that V = V(0))
We again note that one needs to be careful and observe that the minimization (or maximization) problem does not decouple due to the constraint on the controls of the two players. Although the adversary's strategy can be derived using an approach similar to the previous problem, the designer's strategy requires more care. Let
to be a ranking of the set L(v) such that L π,1 (v) ≤ . . . ≤ L π,|L| (v), and the set
Defineˆ := |L π (0)|, whereˆ ≤ by definition of the operator Φ (.). By a possible abuse of notation, we let L π,k (v) correspond to the link {i, j} ∈ L π (v) and to the value (a ij + v ij )f ij associated with it; the context should make clear as to which attribute of L π,k (v) we are referring to. We assume that L π,1 (v) ≥ . . . ≥ L π,ˆ (v). Further, define the sets if ∃S ⊂ Φ(P(0)),
4:
Exist for loop. 5: end 6: end 7: if Nv = 0 8:
Set v ij = b for all {i, j} ∈ Φ P(0) . 9: end
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of both players; for a proof, see [18] . Theorem 3: The optimal strategy for the adversary in the min-max problem is
For the network designer, the optimal strategy v is obtained by running Algorithm I and setting v ij = 0 when f ij > 0
D. Complexity of the Optimal Strategies
Let us now study the complexity of the optimal strategies. We first start with the max-min problem. Assuming as in Remark 2 that the players switch their strategies a total of K times over [0, T ], we conclude that the worst-case complexity of the strategy of either player is O(K · m log m) as their strategies involve merely the ranking of sets of size at most 2m. As for the min-max problem, the complexity of the adversary's strategy is O(K · m log m). The main bottleneck in the strategy of the designer is step 2 in Algorithm I. The size of the set P(0) is at most m − ; thus, the worstcase complexity for the designer is K ·
By comparison with the complexity expression in Remark 2, we conclude that the derived optimal strategies achieve vast complexity reductions.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
The optimal strategies derived in Section III are defined in terms f ij 's which depend on x and p, which in turn are defined in terms of the control. However, we have not derived the optimal trajectories that satisfy the canonical equations given by the MP in (6) and (7) , and hence in that sense the solution was incomplete. Since the system is linear time-varying, the solutions will be given in terms of a state transition matrix. This makes working with f ij intractable. The following theorem provides a procedure to arrive at the optimal solutions without the need to compute p(t). We will be using the term "connected component" to refer to a set of connected nodes which have the same values.
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the rankings performed as part of the optimal strategies of the max-min and min-max problems can be carried out by replacing f ij (t) by ν ij (t). Further, it is optimal for the players to modify a total of links.
Furthermore, if either player has an optimal strategy of modifying less than links, then either G has a cut of size less than or the nodes have reached consensus at time t. In either of the cases, modifying links is also optimal.
Proof: We will prove the theorem for the min-max problem. Similar arguments apply to the max-min problem. For a fixed strategy of the designer v , we will show that it is optimal for the maximizer to rank the links based on their
Then, by applying the same reasoning as in Thm 2, we can arrive at v with the ranking performed using ν ij . The main complication in solving the adjoint equations is that the system is time-varying. However, under Assumption 2, the functions x(t), p(t) are piecewise continuous (p.c.). Hence, the function f ij (t), for all {i, j} ∈ G, is also p.c. and its value cannot change abruptly over a finite interval. As a result, we can regard the system as a time-invariant one over a small interval [t 0 , t 0 + δ] ⊂ [0, T ], where 0 < δ ≤ τ , and τ was defined in (5) . The proof comprises three steps.
1. Show that it is optimal for the players to change links. 2. Show that, over a small interval [t 0 , t 0 + δ], it is optimal for the adversary to switch from a strategy u to another strategy u , where u entails ranking the links based on their w ij values. 3. Show that allowing u to mimic u for the remaining time preserves the gain obtained over [t 0 , t 0 + δ].
The first step was proven in [12] for the maximization problem. In the min-max (or max-min) case, the proof remains the same. This is because for a fixed u , by Thm 1 in [12] , it follows that it is optimal for the designer to modify links 1 . By Thm 2, we deduce that N u = .
The second step is to show that, according to strategy u , the adversary will break the links with the lowest w ij = (a ij + v ij )ν ij values. We want to show that switching to u at some time t ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + δ] can improve the utility of the adversary. Let the strategy u be identical to u except that under strategy u the adversary chooses to break link {k, l}, while there is a link {i, j} such that w ij < w kl . Over a small interval, u and u induce certain system matrices. Let the system matrix corresponding to u over [t 0 , t 0 + δ] be A(u, v ) = A. Since the control strategies of both players are time-invariant over this interval, the state trajectory is:
1 Conditions were given in [12] as to when it is also optimal for a player to modify fewer than links.
Let P (t) := e At . Due to the structure of A, P (t) is a doubly stochastic matrix for t ≥ 0. Let the matrix induced by u over [t 0 , t ) be A, and the system matrix corresponding to u over [t , t 0 +δ] be B. Define the doubly stochastic matrix Q(t) := e Bt , t ≥ 0. Showing that this switch can improve the utility of the designer is equivalent to proving the following inequality [12] :
where Λ(t, t ) = P (t −t 0 )Q(2(t−t ))P (t −t 0 )−P (2(t− t 0 )). A sufficient condition for (9) to hold is
As t ↓ 0, we can write P (t) = I + tA + O t 2 , where O t 2 /t ≤ L for some finite constant L. Following similar steps to those in [12] , we can write
For small enough δ, the higher order terms are dominated by the first term. Hence, if there are links {i, j} and {k, l} such that ν ij ≤ ν kl , there exists t such that h(t, x(t 0 )) < 0 for t ∈ (t , t 0 + δ]. Hence, breaking (k, l) is not optimal. This proves that the optimal strategy for the adversary is to break the links with the lowest w ij values. As for the designer, by examining Algorithm I, we conclude that the sets P and P can be redefined in terms of ν ij instead of f ij , because as just shown L π (v) can also be redefined in terms of w ij . The final step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy u guarantees an improved utility for the adversary regardless of how the original trajectory corresponding to u changes beyond time t 0 + δ. To this end, we will assume that from time t 0 + δ onward, strategy u will mimic strategy u. Assume that strategy u switches from matrix A to matrix C over the interval [t 0 + δ, t 0 + 2δ], and define R(t) := e Ct . Hence, strategy u will also switch from the system matrix B to matrix C. However, the trajectories corresponding to u and u will have different initial conditions at time t 0 + δ, due to the switch that strategy u made at time t . Fig. 1 illustrates this idea. Consider the behavior of the system over the interval [t 0 +δ, t 0 +2δ] where the system is time-invariant. Then, it suffices to prove that [18] t0+2δ t0+δ k(t) · c(t)dt < 0, where c(t) is the difference between the utilities resulting from the trajectory that includes a switch to strategy B at time t and the one that does not switch at time t . After performing a first-order Taylor expansion, c(t) can be shown to be equal to [18] 
which is negative for small δ. Hence, the gain that was obtained by switching to strategy B at time t is preserved and the proof is complete. Remark 3: (Potential-Theoretic Analogy) As discussed in [12] , when the graph is viewed as an electrical network, a ij +v ij can be viewed as the conductance of link {i, j} and x i − x j as the potential difference across the link. Therefore, the optimal strategy of the designer in both problems involves finding the links with the highest potential difference (or the lowest ν ij 's) and increasing the conductance of those links by setting v ij = b. This leads to increasing the power dissipation across those links, which translates to increasing the information flow across the network and results in faster convergence. The optimal strategy of the adversary should therefore involve breaking the links with highest power dissipation. But power dissipation is given by (a ij + v ij )(x i − x j ) 2 , and this is exactly what the adversary targets according to Thm 4.
V. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN SPE
Thus far, we have solved the min-max and max-min problems separately and showed that the derived optimal strategies achieve the upper and lower values. Hence, to prove the existence of an SPE, it remains to verify that the pair of inequalities (3) hold under some assumptions, even though the strategy sets of the players are non-rectangular in the max-min problem. Besides the issue of non-rectangular action sets, the main reason that the upper and lower values are different is the ability of the minimizer to deceive the maximizer by altering the ranking of the most negative values. If we remove this ability from the network designer, we should expect that an SPE would exist. The following theorem (whose proof can be found in [18] ) makes this argument formal. Define γ := 4||x0|| 2 ∞ 2 . Theorem 5: Given > 0, so that γ > 1, a sufficient condition for the existence of an SPE for the underlying zerosum game between the network designer and the adversary is to select b such that
given that T is small enough and a ij = a kl and a ij > γa kl whenever a ij > a kl , for all {i, j}, {k, l} ∈ E.
Remark 4: The condition of the above theorem requires the network to be sufficiently diverse in the sense that the weights of the links have to be not only different from each other, but also a factor γ apart. This is due to the fact that we were seeking uniform bounds on the f ij 's.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated and solved two problems that capture the competition between an adversary and a network designer in a dynamical network. We considered practical models for the players by constraining their actions along the problem horizon. The derived strategies were shown to exhibit a low worst-case complexity. We also showed that the optimal strategies admit a potential-theoretic analogy, and they can be implemented without needing to solve the adjoint equations. Finally, we showed that when the link weights are sufficiently diverse, an SPE exists for the zero-sum game between the designer and the adversary.
